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  We re-examine optimal monetary policy when lump-sum taxes are 
unavailable. Under commitment, we show that, with alternative utility functions 
to that considered in Nicolini’s related analysis, the direction of the incentive to 
cheat may depend on the initial level of government debt, with low debt 
creating an incentive towards surprise deflation, but high debt the reverse. 
Under discretion, we show that the economy will not necessarily tend to the 
Friedman Rule, as Obstfeld found. Instead it may tend to the critical debt level 
at which there is no cheating incentive under commitment, and inflation and 
could well be positive here. 
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1. Introduction 
As is well known, optimal, welfare-based monetary policy, even in a flex-price, 
efficiently functioning economy, is subject to a time consistency problem if the government 
does not have lump-sum taxes or transfers at its disposal. This is because ‘surprise’ inflation 
may be a substitute source of non-distorting revenue, alleviating the problem of being unable 
to reach the first-best, ‘Friedman Rule’ outcome of a zero nominal interest rate. In this world, 
monetary policy must be implemented by open-market swaps of money and government 
debt, and the optimal second-best policy is to use debt to smooth intertemporally the 
distortions caused by inflation. Surprise inflation can help reduce these distortions. 
Although this problem is familiar, significant puzzles about it remain. First is that the 
optimal monetary policy is likely to be degenerate, in that the best surprise rate of inflation to 
pick is infinity, because this maximises the lump sum of revenue appropriated by the 
government. Attention was drawn to this feature by Lucas and Stokey (1983). However, a 
well-defined optimum can be obtained if money enters the economy in such a way that there 
is a welfare cost of current inflation, since this cost must then be balanced against the 
benefits. This feature was introduced in an interesting contribution by Nicolini (1998). The 
presence of the cost, on the other hand, leads to a second puzzle: it may now be the case that 
the time consistency problem takes the form of an incentive to create surprise deflation (i.e. 
inflation lower than expected). This inverts all our usual ideas about time inconsistency in 
monetary policy. A third puzzle arises if we assume policy is conducted under discretion, 
rather than (as implicit in the discussion so far) under commitment. In this case lack of trust 
in the government’s projected policy might be conjectured to lead to higher expected and 
actual inflation; but in fact it has been argued that discretion will lead in the long run to lower 
inflation – in particular to convergence to the Friedman Rule where inflation is negative. 
Such an argument is presented in two papers by Obstfeld (1991, 1997).
1 
                                                 
1 Here we refer to the case of Obstfeld’s analysis where the authorities’ objective function is as close as possible 
to private utility functions.   2
In this paper we reconsider this optimal monetary policy problem. We do so using 
Nicolini’s model of a simple cash-in-advance economy, thereby avoiding the first of the 
above-mentioned puzzles. We extend his analysis of the case of commitment a little, but our 
main contribution is to the case of discretion, which he did not study. The model enables us 
to conduct a pure welfare-based analysis of optimal policy under discretion, avoiding 
Obstfeld’s need to postulate an ad hoc objective function for the policymaker. Our analysis 
shows that the second and third of the above-mentioned puzzles are related. Specifically, we 
find that under discretion it is not necessarily true that in the long run the economy will 
converge on the Friedman Rule. Depending on consumer preferences, it may converge on a 
different steady state where inflation is above the Friedman-Rule level, and quite possibly 
positive. We call this the ‘time-consistent steady state’. The force which makes such a steady 
state possible turns out to be the incentive which exists towards surprise deflation under 
commitment. This latter counteracts the more familiar incentive towards surprise inflation, 
and makes it possible that, under commitment, a critical level of inherited government debt 
exists such that the two incentives exactly cancel out, leading to no temptation to behave in a 
time-inconsistent manner. It transpires that this critical debt level is the same as the one 
associated with the ‘time consistent steady state’ to which the economy may converge under 
discretion. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the economy. We 
examine optimal monetary policy under commitment in Section 3. In Section 4 we study 
optimal monetary policy under discretion, providing both analytical results and numerical 
computations. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Structure of the Economy 
The economy consists of many identical households who consume the single type of 
output good, supply a single type of labour, and hold money - motivated by a cash-in-
advance constraint - and bonds. Markets are perfectly competitive and all prices are flexible. 
The government issues money and bonds. Bonds are taken to be ‘real’, or indexed, as in the   3
papers already cited.
2 A key constraint on the government is that it does not have access to 
lump-sum taxes and transfers: the money supply must be changed through open market 
operations, i.e. purchases or sales of bonds in exchange for money. Since our focus is purely 
on monetary policy, we shall ignore conventional distorting taxes, and treat government 
spending on goods and services as exogenous. 
Technology takes the form yt = nt, where yt is output and nt is labour input. Hence 
competitive firms will set a price equal to the wage, and make zero profits. For the 
representative household, the optimisation problem is: 
maximise  [ ] 0 ()
t
tt t Uc n β α
∞
= Σ−  ( U′ > 0, U′′ < 0) 
s.t.  tt t p cM ≤ , 
  11 1 (1 ) tt t t t t t t t t t M bp R pn pc M b p + ++ ++ +=+ + ,    for t = 0,...,∞, 
 with  M0, b0 given.  (1) 
Mt,bt are, respectively, the quantities of money and real bonds held at the start of period t; Rt 
is the nominal interest rate between t-1 and t; ct is consumption; nt is labour supply; and pt is 
the price level. The key feature of this problem is that M0 and b0 are given. In this way the 
model incorporates a ‘welfare cost of current inflation’: a rise in p0 (and equal proportional 
rise in all pt, t > 0) depresses the real value of the household’s initial cash holdings, so that 
(provided the cash-in-advance constraint is binding) current consumption is squeezed. This 
liquidity squeeze occurs because the household is assumed to be unable to visit the asset 
market at the start of the period: in any period, goods markets open before asset markets. 
Such a timing assumption was introduced by Svensson (1985), and is the reverse of the more 
common timing assumption in cash-in-advance models associated with Lucas (e.g. Lucas 
                                                 
2 Although it would be more ‘realistic’ to assume nominal bonds, this would obviously make it easier to 
generate a ‘surprise inflation’ result, so to assume real bonds cannot be said to facilitate our main conclusion. 
An interesting related analysis which does assume nominal bonds is by Diaz-Gimenez et al. (2002).   4
(1982)). Its value in the present context is that it captures the idea that current inflation has a 
cost because agents cannot instantaneously adjust their portfolios.
3 
From the first-order conditions for the household’s problem we can readily derive: 













+ = ,  t = 0,...,∞, (3) 
(in which it has been assumed that Rt > 0, so that the cash-in-advance constraint binds). (3) 
indicates that the real interest rate is a constant equal to the inverse subjective discount rate. 
The nominal interest rate thus moves one-to-one with the expected inflation rate. (2) indicates 
that consumption is uniquely and negatively related (since U′′ < 0) to the nominal interest 
rate, or equivalently to the expected inflation rate. This reflects the distorting effect of the 
inflation tax: the earnings from an increase in current labour supply cannot be spent 
immediately, owing to the cash-in-advance constraint, and their future value is hence eroded 
by expected inflation, which therefore provides a disincentive  to  labour  supply and so to 
consumption. Writing mt ≡ Mt/pt, we note that mt = ct provided that the cash-in-advance 
constraint binds, which reminds us that expected inflation equivalently reduces the demand 
for real balances. 
Equilibrium in the private sector of the economy may now be determined. At this point, 
suppose an arbitrary monetary policy defined by a sequence of monetary growth rates, 
0 {} t µ










+ + ′ =
+
, (4) 
which has been obtained from (2), (3) and pt+1/pt = (1+µt)ct/ct+1 (the latter being implied by mt 
=  ct). Under perfect foresight (4) determines ct in a pure forward-looking manner, as a 
                                                 
3 As Nicolini (1998) shows, it can be interpreted as a more compact version of the ‘limited participation’ model 
of Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984). There, agents are divided into two groups who are only 
allowed to visit the bank in alternate periods.   5
function of current and future monetary growth rates  0 {} tss µ
∞
+ = . With consumption tied down 
by (4), output is determined via the goods market clearing condition: 
  tt yc g = +  (5) 
where g is the level of government spending. 
A key role is played in what follows by the government’s budget constraint. The single-
period constraint may be written: 
  11 1 (1 ) tt t t t t t t bp R pg M M b p + ++ ++ = −+ . (6) 
Note the absence of lump-sum taxes or transfers. Under our timing assumptions, (bt,Mt) are 
predetermined in period t, and the only policy action open to the government (since we treat g 
as exogenous) is an open-market sale or purchase of bonds, which raises or lowers bt+1, 
lowering or raising Mt+1, respectively. We may integrate (6) forwards, incorporating (3) (and 
appealing to a ‘No Ponzi Game’ condition), to obtain: 





tt t bR m g βµ
β
∞
= += Σ −
−
. (7) 
This is the government’s intertemporal budget constraint expressed in terms of ‘cash-flow 
seigniorage’, i.e. µtmt. We may also re-write it as: 





tt t bR m R m g β
β
∞
= += − + Σ −
−
. (8) 
(8) gives the same constraint in terms of ‘opportunity-cost seigniorage’, i.e. Rtmt.
4 Notice that 
m0 enters (8) differently from m1,m2, etc. Algebraically speaking, this is the source of time 
inconsistency, as we discuss further below. 
 
                                                 
4 See Herrendorf (1997) for a useful discussion of these two definitions. To obtain (8) from (7), note that [Mt+1-
Mt]/pt can be re-written as mt+1β[1+Rt+1] - mt.   6
3. Optimal Monetary Policy Under Commitment 
In this section we assume that there is some commitment mechanism which obliges the 
government to adhere to the monetary policy which it chooses in period 0,  0 {} t µ
∞ . Its 
optimisation problem is then: 
maximise w.r.t.  0 {} t µ
∞   0 [() ]
t
tt t Uc c g β αα
∞
= Σ− −  
s.t.  00 0 1
11
(1 ) ( ) 1
1
t















+ + ′ =
+
    for t = 0,...,∞, 
 with  (1+R0)b0, g given.  (9) 
We have substituted out Rt using (2), mt using mt = ct, and nt using the production function 
and (5). It is clear that, rather than treat the µt’s as the control variables, we can equivalently 
treat the ct’s as the control variables, leaving the µt’s to be determined residually by the 
difference equation constraints. This reduces the problem to: 
maximise w.r.t.  0 {} t c
∞  0 [() ]
t
tt t Uc c g β αα
∞
= Σ− −  
s.t.  00 0 1
11
(1 ) ( ) 1
1
t




⎡ ⎤ ′ −+ − = − Σ − ⎢ ⎥ − ⎣ ⎦
. (10) 
We easily see that this problem has an unconstrained maximum where: 
 () t Uc α ′ =       for all t. (11) 
This is the first-best, ‘Friedman Rule’ solution, where Rt = 0. The government’s intertemporal 
budget constraint in general prevents the attainment of this outcome unless initial government 
debt is sufficiently negative. Thus, in a second-best situation, ct will be less than its 
Friedman-Rule level, and an optimal policy must trade off the deviation of ct from this with 
the deviation of any other cs.   7














′ − ′ −=
′ +−
    for t = 1,...,∞. (12) 
Here, σ(ct) is the ‘relative risk aversion’ measure of curvature of U(ct), i.e.  ( )/ ( ) tt t cU c U c ′′ ′ − . 
It is immediate from this that ct is the same for all t = 1,...,∞. It is further apparent that this 
common  ct ( ≡  c, say) is in general different from c0. Hence an optimal time path of ct 
typically takes the form of either a ‘step up’ or a ‘step down’ (see Figure 1). Inspection of 
(12) further shows that if σ < 1 then we obtain c0 < c (a ‘step up’), and if σ > 1 then we obtain 
c0> c (a ‘step down’). In the special case where σ = 1, the optimal time path is ‘flat’.
5 
The above results are as in Nicolini (1998). Nicolini however restricts attention to 
utility functions of the ‘constant relative risk aversion’ (CRRA) class, so that σ is an 
exogenous parameter. Here we will explore the consequences of more general utility 
functions. A visual aid to doing so is provided by Figure 2. The diagram exploits the fact that, 
under an optimal policy, ct = c for t = 1,...,∞, in order to represent the problem in reduced 
form. The indifference curves over (c0,c) are given by the lifetime utility function written as 
1
00 () [ 1 ] [( ) ] Uc c g Uc c g α αββ α α
− −−+− − −, and the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint contracts to: 
  00 0
11
() ( 1 )
11
cU c c c R b g
β
β αβ
⎡⎤ ′ =− − + − ⎢⎥ −− ⎣⎦
. (13) 
Figure 1 depicts this as a backward-bending curve. This reflects the ‘seigniorage Laffer 
curve’: as future inflation rates (and thus nominal interest rates) are raised, c falls, but 
nevertheless future seigniorage revenue at first rises, permitting less revenue to be raised 
through current seigniorage, and thus permitting higher c0. However (depending on the shape 
of U(c)) the Laffer curve may have a peak, such that revenue starts to fall as future inflation 
continues to be increased and c continues to be reduced. Initial government debt, (1+R0)b0, 
                                                 
5 Corresponding to these time paths of consumption, it is easy to show that the time paths of debt are a ‘step 
down’, a ‘step up’, and ‘flat’, respectively.   8
acts as a parameter which fixes the position of the budget constraint: higher initial debt shifts 
it to the left. By varying initial debt we thus trace out a locus of points of tangency with the 
indifference curves - the ‘expansion path’. The equation of the expansion path is just the first-
order condition (12), with ‘ct’ substituted by c. 
Consider now the shape of the expansion path. First, it clearly passes through the point 
(c ,c ), where c  is the Friedman Rule consumption level given by (11). Second, from the 
results presented earlier, the expansion path must lie above (below) the 45
o line at levels of c 
such that σ(c) < 1 (>1). It follows that if U(c) is such that there exists a value cc at which σ(c) 
= 1, then the expansion path must cross the 45
o line at this critical value of c. (For this to be 
of interest, we obviously need cc < c ). Third, we would intuitively expect the expansion path 
to be upward-sloping (i.e. under an optimal policy lower initial government debt would be 
used to raise both c0 and c)
6. Hence, fourth, if cc exists then the question arises as to whether 
the intersection with the 45
o line occurs ‘from above’ or ‘from below’. Differentiating (12) 











This is clearly less than or greater than one as σ′(cc) is (respectively) positive or negative. 
That is, the expansion path cuts the 45
o line from above if the relative risk aversion parameter 
is increasing in consumption at the intersection point, and from below if it is decreasing.
7  
Figure 2 illustrates the case where an intersection of the expansion path and the 45
o line 
exists, and where it occurs from above. In this case there must also exist a critical value of 
(1+R0)b0 such that, if initial debt happened to take this value, the optimal policy would be to 
choose c0 = c = cc. The associated budget constraint is the one which passes through the point 
C. If initial debt were slightly higher than this level, the budget constraint would lie slightly 
farther to the left, and the optimum would be at a point like A, where c0 < c. Conversely if 
                                                 
6 The condition for this is that the RHS of (12) be decreasing in c. It turns out that the same condition is 
necessary for the optimisation problem’s second-order conditions to be satisfied, so we need this condition to 
hold. It holds provided that σ(c) is increasing, constant, or not too strongly decreasing, in c. 
7 (14) is not the correct expression for the slope at the Friedman-Rule point. The slope there is instead given 
simply by σ, and so is greater or less than one as σ is greater or less than one.   9
initial debt were slightly lower, the optimum would be at a point like B, where c0 > c. In the 
case in Figure 2, then, the shape of the optimal time path of consumption depends on the 
initial level of debt: ‘high’ debt gives rise to a ‘step up’ shape, and low debt to a ‘step down’ 
shape. With the CRRA utility function used by Nicolini (1998), on the other hand, the 
expansion path lies either always above, or always below, the 45
o line, and the magnitude of 
initial government debt is therefore irrelevant, qualitatively speaking, to the shape of the 
optimum time path of consumption. 
In order to assess whether there is a potential time consistency problem with the optimal 
policy, it must be compared with the optimal policy if the government were permitted to re-
optimise in period 1. This re-optimisation is only hypothetical, since we have assumed that 
there is a commitment mechanism to prevent the government from actually deviating from its 
period-0 plan. Let us denote the optimal choice of ct from the perspective of period s (s ≤ t) as 
| ts c . We are particularly interested in whether  1|1 c  is smaller or greater than  1|0 c . Since c1 = 
M1/p1 and M1 is predetermined,  1|1 c  <  1|0 c  indicates that the government in period 1 would 
wish to set p1 higher than was planned in period 0, i.e. that there is an incentive to ‘surprise 
inflation’. Conversely, if  1|1 c  >  1|0 c , the incentive is to ‘surprise deflation’. Following 
Nicolini’s method we may readily show that, if the period-0 optimal time path takes the form 
of a ‘step up’, then in period 1 there is an incentive to surprise inflation; while if it takes the 
form of a ‘step down’, then in period 1 there is an incentive to surprise deflation. A summary 
sketch of the two possible relationships between the period-0 and period-1 optimal time paths 
for consumption is thus as in Figure 1. 
Together with the earlier results, this then implies that if there exists a critical 
consumption level (strictly less than the Friedman Rule level) at which the coefficient of 
‘relative risk aversion’ in consumption equals one, then associated with this is a critical level 
of government debt such that, if initial debt happens to take this value, there is no time 
inconsistency. Moreover, if relative risk aversion is increasing (decreasing) in consumption at 
the critical level, then initial debt above the critical debt level will be associated with a 
temptation to create surprise inflation (deflation); and initial debt below, with a temptation to 
create surprise deflation (inflation). This is an extension of Nicolini’s (1998) main finding. It   10
says that if relative risk aversion is not a constant, then the direction of time inconsistency 
may depend on the level of initial government debt. An intuitively plausible outcome, we 
would argue, arises in the case of increasing relative risk aversion. Here, while the rather 
unorthodox incentive to create surprise deflation dominates for low levels of debt, the more 
conventional incentive to create surprise inflation dominates for high levels. This outcome 
occurs if the expansion path has the shape shown in Figure 2.
8 
A natural follow-up question concerns how likely it is to find a utility function 
possessing the properties just highlighted. Although the CRRA function is a common utility 
function with some convenient features, there is of course no shortage of alternatives. 
Consider, for example, quadratic utility,  ˆ () [ / 2 ] Uc cc c = − . (With this,  ˆ c ≥ α is needed to 
ensure a non-negative Friedman-Rule consumption level.) σ(c) =  ˆ /[ ] ccc −  for this function, 
so a value of c such that σ = 1 clearly exists, namely at c =  ˆ c/2. Moreover, σ is clearly 
everywhere increasing in c. The associated expansion path then looks exactly like that in 
Figure 2, provided that  ˆ c > 2α.
9 Another common functional form, the ‘constant absolute 
risk aversion’ (CARA) function, can similarly yield an expansion path like that in Figure 2. 
We hence conclude that the preferences required in order for the above result to apply are not 
especially unusual. It is true that CRRA preferences are widely used in macroeconomics, 
partly because they have the convenient property of being consistent with balanced growth. 
However, quadratic preferences are also widely used in consequence of some other 
convenient properties: for example, in the presence of uncertainty they generate the exact 
consumption-as-a-random-walk result, and they underpin mean-variance portfolio analysis. 
In the present paper our aim is to explore the implications of some familiar utility functions 
as a theoretical exercise, rather than to claim any one function fits the facts well. Clearly 
                                                 
8 A referee points out that, in an extension to his main analysis, Nicolini (1998) also notes that there may be a 
critical level of initial debt such that there is no temptation to time inconsistency. This is where σ > 1 and debt is 
nominal. Nominal debt generates an incentive towards surprise inflation which could exactly offset the incentive 
towards surprise deflation. However Nicolini does not develop the analysis of this case. 
9 This condition ensures that  ˆ c/2 is less than the Friedman-Rule consumption level,  ˆ c-α. If it is violated, the 
expansion path lies everywhere above the 45
o line. Even though quadratic utility by itself does not therefore 
guarantee an expansion path like that in Figure 2, we can still say that, with quadratic utility, if an incentive to 
surprise deflation is ever to exist (i.e. if part of the expansion path is ever to lie below the 45
o line), then a 
critical consumption level as defined in the main text must also exist.   11
much more elaboration of our bare-bones model would be needed before it could be 
confronted with the data. 
A further natural question concerns why the direction of time inconsistency should 
depend on the size of σ. As noted, in a CIA model with Lucas’s timing assumption, the 
temptation to ‘cheat’ in monetary policy is always towards surprise inflation. In the present 
framework, the incentive to raise all current and future prices equiproportionally in order to 
appropriate revenue in a ‘non-distorting’ way is counterbalanced by the incentive not to 
generate a large welfare cost of current inflation through the liquidity-squeeze mechanism 
explained earlier. The direction of the temptation to cheat depends on how these incentives 
change, relative to the incentives for the setting of subsequent periods’ inflation, as time 
advances. First, observe that a temptation to reduce current inflation relative to what was 
planned would arise if an increase in current inflation (increase in p0/p-1, from the perspective 
of period 0) were to provide a smaller gain in the PV of seigniorage and a larger loss of 
lifetime utility
10 than a projected increase in future inflation (increase in p1/p0, from the 
perspective of period 0). This is because, when the future ‘arrives’, the seigniorage benefit 
would be smaller than it was from the vantage point of the period before and the utility cost 
would be larger, so the government would perceive an incentive to deviate downwards from 
what it had planned. Such changes in incentive occur when σ > 1 because future consumption 
demand is then inelastic with respect to future inflation (or, equivalently, 1+Rt), as can be 
seen from (2); while current consumption demand is always unit-elastic with respect to 
current inflation, as follows from the cash-in-advance constraint. Hence a 1-unit increase in 
p0/p-1 causes a larger loss of lifetime utility than a (1/β)-unit increase in p1/p0. It also causes a 
smaller gain in the PV of seigniorage, because the inelastic future consumption demand 
means a weaker dampening effect on revenue of the shrinkage in the tax base as the inflation 




                                                 
10 Through its ‘direct’ effect on utility, ignoring the indirect effect via its budgetary impact   12
4. Optimal Monetary Policy Under Discretion 
If the government is unable to commit to a given policy plan made in period t, 
|0 {} ts ts µ
∞
+= , then it is not rational for households’ forecasts of future µt+s’s, as of time t (denote 
these by  |
e
ts t µ + ), to equal those in the plan. Instead, forecasts should be based only on 
variables observable at time t. The government’s inherited stock of debt is one obvious 
‘observable’ on which to condition forecasts, since it is clear from the previous section that 
initial debt is a key determinant of the government’s optimal policy choices. Other 
observables could also be used, such as current and past values of µt. However, this would 
introduce an element of ‘reputation-building’ behaviour into policy. Since we wish to focus 
on purely ‘discretionary’ behaviour, we use only debt as the basis for private forecasts. 
Formally, the concept of equilibrium employed will be that of Markov-perfect equilibrium.
11 
First, it is useful, as Obstfeld does, to define the concept of government ‘commitments’ 
  0 (1 )
s
tt t s t s kb R g β
∞
= + ≡+ + Σ . (15) 
‘Commitments’ is just the spending, in present-value terms, over which the government does 
not have discretion. Formally, we will use kt rather than debt as the state variable in what 
follows, although, given our assumption that g is time-invariant, kt is simply debt plus the 
constant, g/(1-β). Note that the government’s budget constraint in terms of kt is (cf. (6)): 
  1 tt t t km k µ β + = + . (16) 
We now suppose that, in period t, households forecast (µt+1,kt+2) using the rules: 
  1| 1 ˆ()
e
tt t k µφ + + = , (17) 
  2| 1 ˆ()
e
tt t kk ψ ++ = . (18) 
                                                 
11 This is the same basic idea as in Obstfeld (1991, 1997). His 1991 paper studies a small open economy version 
of the optimal inflation tax smoothing problem, while his 1997 paper does the same for a closed economy. The 
key difference from the present analysis, as noted in the Introduction, is that Obstfeld’s model does not include a 
‘welfare cost of current inflation’. This obliges him to use a government objective function which differs from 
the private utility function, being obtained by adding on an ad hoc ‘cost of current inflation’ term to the latter.   13
(Note that kt+1 is observable by households in period t - since they can observe µtmt and thus 
use (16) - so that it is appropriate to base their forecasts upon it.)  ˆ(.) φ  and  ˆ(.) ψ  are for the 
moment treated as arbitrary functions, but they will later be determined by imposing a 
rationality requirement as part of the conditions of Markov-perfect equilibrium. To generate 
an s-period ahead forecast, (18) may be used repeatedly in (17): 
 
1
|1 ˆ ˆ (( ) )
es
ts t t k µφ ψ
−
++ = , (19) 
where  ˆˆ ˆ ˆ (.) ( (... (.)...))
n ψψ ψ ψ ≡  denotes the nth iterate of the function  ˆ(.) ψ . 
These forecasting rules can next be used to determine equilibrium consumption in 
period t. Recall that the equilibrium value of ct is given by the private-sector law of motion, 
(4), solved in a forward-looking manner. The relevant µt’s to use in this equation are now the 
expected values as given by (19), rather than the values from the government’s policy plan, 
since what counts for determining the actual ct are households’ expectations. It is helpful to 
consider the determination of ct in two stages. First, given kt+1 and thus a sequence of 




+=  generated by (19), we use (4) for periods t+1 onwards to solve for 
ct+1. This yields households’ forecast, as of period t, of the equilibrium value of ct+1. Since it 
is contingent on the observed kt+1, we may write it as  1| 1 ˆ()
e
tt t ck θ ++ = . Second, using  1 ˆ() t k θ +  in 
(4) for period t, we obtain the equilibrium value of current ct: 
  11





















Current  ct thus depends on two variables: the currently observed µt, and the currently 
observed kt+1, whose effect operates via influencing expectations about future µt+s’s. The 
function e(.) captures this expectations effect. The form of e(.) derives from the form of  ˆ(.) θ , 
which is in turn derived from the forms of  ˆ(.) φ  and  ˆ(.) ψ . 
The government now treats (20) as part of the economy’s structure, and thus as a given. 
Its optimisation problem under discretion is therefore to choose  0 {} t µ
∞ to maximise lifetime   14
utility of the typical agent subject to (20) and (16) for t = 0,...,∞, and to given k0. By 
substituting (20) into (16) and into the maximand, we can express this as: 































,    for t = 0,...,∞, 
 with  k0 given.  (21) 
(21) reveals that the government’s dynamic optimisation problem under discretion - unlike 
that under commitment - has a standard recursive form. That is, every period, the new value 
of the state (kt+1) depends only on the current value of the state (kt) and on the current value of 
the control (µt), while the flow maximand also depends only on these same two variables 
(although it is kt+1 which appears in the flow maximand, kt+1 is an implicit function of (kt,µt) 
via the constraint). This structure means that the problem can in principle be solved by 
dynamic programming. In turn, dynamic programming ensures that the solution is time 
consistent.
12 
The dynamic programming perspective also makes clear that the solution to our 
problem can be expressed as a pair of feedback rules on the state; for example 
 () tt k µ φ = , (22) 
  1 () tt kk ψ + = . (23) 
(22)-(23) define the government’s optimal monetary policy having taken as our starting point 
the public’s arbitrary forecasting rules, (17)-(18). We notice that (22)-(23) relate the same 
variables as (17)-(18); hence, for (17)-(18) to provide ‘rational’ forecasts by the public, we 
need the functions  ˆ(.) φ  and  (.) φ , and also  ˆ(.) ψ  and  (.) ψ , to be the same. In this case 
households will forecast correctly no matter what the value of kt. The discretionary, or 
                                                 
12 Given that the function e(.) has as yet unknown properties, there is a question as to whether the optimisation 
problem (21) is well defined. Here we proceed as if this is the case, but we return to the question below.   15
Markov-perfect, equilibrium is thus a pair of forecasting rules which have the property that 
they reproduce themselves in the guise of optimal government policy rules. 
It is convenient, as earlier, to rewrite the optimisation problem in order to treat the ct’s 
rather than µt’s as the controls. To do this we use (20) to substitute out the µt’s from (21), so 
that the problem is transformed to: 
maximise w.r.t.  0 {} t c
∞  0 [( ) ]
t
tt t Uc c g β αα
∞
= ′ Σ− −  
s.t.  11 () tt t t ke k c k β + + =− + ,    for t = 0,...,∞, 
 with  k0 given.  (24) 
The first-order conditions for this are then easily derived: 
  11
1
() [ ( ) ] [ 1 () ] tt t Uc Uc ek αα
β
++ ′′ ′ −= − +     for t = 0,...,∞. (25) 
Repeating here the constraint from the problem (24), 
  11 () tt t t ke k c k β + + = −+ , (26) 
we see that (25)-(26) constitute a first-order dynamical system in (kt,ct), which determines the 
evolution of the economy under the optimal discretionary policy. Given that kt is a 
predetermined variable whereas ct is not, c0 will generally be tied down in relation to k0 by 
the transversality condition. This hence determines a particular solution of the system (25)-
(26) which constitutes the solution of the optimisation problem. We denote this solution as: 
 () tt ck θ = . (27) 
Equivalently, (27) is the optimal feedback rule of the control upon the state variable. If the 
optimum is such that the economy converges on a steady state, then (27) is also the 
‘saddlepath’ solution of (25)-(26). 
Although (.) θ , like e(.), is still at present an unknown function, once it has been 
determined we can substitute it back into (26) to get:   16
  11 () ( ) tt t t ek k k k β θ ++ + =+ . (28) 
This implicitly determines the optimal feedback rule for kt+1, (23). The optimal feedback rule 
for µt, (22), is similarly recoverable by substituting (27) and (23) into (20). The functions e(.) 
and (.) θ  thus play a central role in the Markov-perfect equilibrium, since, if they can be 
determined, the other unknown functions φ(.) and ψ(.) follow. It is also worth noting that in 
equilibrium the function  (.) θ must turn out to be the same as the function  ˆ(.) θ . This is 
because if households’ forecasting rules are always to yield correct predictions, their forecast 
of  ct+1 contingent on kt+1 must coincide with the government’s optimal, and thus actual, 
choice of ct+1 contingent on kt+1. 
We now aim to study the properties of the discretionary equilibrium. We start with the 
steady states. Inspection of (25) suggests two ways in which a stationary solution of the 
dynamical system (25)-(26) may occur. First, (25) is clearly satisfied at the Friedman Rule, 
where U′ - α = 0 for all t. We shall refer to this as the ‘Friedman Rule steady state’ (FRSS), It 
is intuitively clear that if initial government debt is sufficiently negative that the underlying 
‘second-best’ problem is absent, then time inconsistency is removed, and a government 
which started in this fortunate position would have no incentive to move away from it. 
Obstfeld (1991, 1997) similarly identifies the Friedman Rule allocation as a steady state of 
the discretionary equilibrium in his analysis. However, whereas for Obstfeld the Friedman 
Rule allocation is the only steady state, this is not necessarily true here. A second way in 
which a stationary solution of (25) could occur is if there exists a kt+1 at which e′(kt+1) = 0. 
More specifically, we might conjecture that this would be true at the value of kt+1 
corresponding to the ‘critical’ debt level as we defined it for monetary policy under 
commitment. The motivation for such a conjecture is that we know from Section 3 that there 
is no time inconsistency if initial debt happens to equal the critical value, and that, under 
commitment, if the government started with this amount of debt it would choose to stay there. 
Thus it might be hypothesised that, with this critical amount of initial debt, the optimal policy 
under discretion would be the same as under commitment. This second type of steady state 
we shall refer to as the ‘time consistent steady state’ (TCSS).   17
To prove that a TCSS exists under discretion if, in the problem under commitment, 
there exist critical consumption and debt levels as defined in Section 3, consider again the 
definition of the function e(.) (given in (20)). Differentiating this function with respect to k, 
we obtain: 




′′ ′ =−    (29) 
(in which we have equated  ˆ(.) θ  with  (.) θ , for the reason explained). Although  ( ) k θ′  is 
unknown, we do know from Section 3 that σ(c) = 1 at the critical consumption level cc. This 
is therefore sufficient to prove that e′ = 0 at the corresponding critical commitments level 
(call this kc). Hence a stationary solution of (25) does indeed arise at kc. 
The level of inflation at the TCSS is higher than the negative inflation rate (β-1) which 
prevails at the Friedman Rule. Its value depends on the utility function: from (2) and (3), the 
general expression for the inflation rate is (β/α)U′(c) - 1, and at cc this could be positive or 
negative. Hence, if we can show that there are conditions under which the discretionary 
equilibrium converges on the TCSS (for the general case in which the initial k0 ≠ kc) then it 
follows that the long-run destination of the economy under discretion is not necessarily a 
situation of deflation. We may also note that the level of debt at the TCSS is higher than the 
negative level required to sustain the Friedman Rule, and the same is true of the level of 
commitments. Whether they are negative or positive in the absolute again depends on the 
utility function, and also on g.
13 
The evolution of the economy under discretion is governed by (23), which we saw to 
take its form implicitly from (28). Differentiating (28), and evaluating at a generic steady 













+ ′ + ′ ==
′ +
. (30) 
Local convergence to either the FRSS or the TCSS clearly requires that -1 < ψ′ < 1. Hence 
we shall proceed by attempting to solve for  () k θ′  and e′(k) at each type of steady state, in 
                                                 
13 Specifically, setting c0 = c = cc in (13), we have kc  = (1−β)[(β/α)U′(cc)-1]cc, and bc(1+Rc) = kc - g/(1-β).   18
order to determine whether this condition can be satisfied. An expression for e′ has already 
been obtained in (29). Differentiating (29) for a second time yields the following expression 
for e′′, which will be useful below: 
 
22 (/) [ () ( 1 ) () ( 1 ) ] eU U U β α σ θσ θσ θ θ ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′′ ′ ′ ′′ ′ = − +− +− . (31) 
In order to find an expression for θ′, recall that  ( ) t k θ  is the saddlepath solution of the 
dynamical system (25)-(26). By taking a linear approximation to this system about a steady 
state, we may find an expression for θ′. Such a calculation yields: 










ββ ββ β β
β
⎧⎫ ′′ −− ⎪⎪ ⎧⎡ ⎤ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′ =+ + + ± + + + − + ⎨⎨ ⎬ ⎢⎥ ′′ ′′ ⎩⎣ ⎦ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
. (32) 
We now observe that (29), (31) and (32) constitute a system of three simultaneous equations 
in the four unknowns ( , , , ) eeθ θ ′′ ′′′ ′ . Although we cannot solve it as it stands, if we proceed to 
evaluate it at either the FRSS or TCSS, it turns out that we obtain additional restrictions 
which are sufficient to make solution possible. 
Consider first the local dynamics of the FRSS. Setting U′ = α, notice that e′′ drops out 
of (32). (29) and (32) then constitute a system of two equations in just two unknowns, e′ and 
θ′, from which we may hope to solve for e′ and θ′. Appendix A presents the relevant 
calculations. We show that the system can be reduced to a quadratic equation in θ′ as the 
single unknown. Once θ′ has been determined, e′ follows from (29) and ψ′ from (30). Since 
the quadratic implies two possible solutions for θ′, there are also two possible solutions for e′ 
and ψ′. The point of particular interest is whether either of the solutions for ψ′ have absolute 
value less than one. The key result demonstrated in Appendix A is that if σ < 1, there is 
exactly one solution for ψ′ with absolute value less than one; but if σ > 1 there are no 
solutions with absolute value less than one. Combining this with our earlier finding, we thus 
conclude that:   19
Proposition 1 The Friedman-Rule consumption level and associated negative debt level 
constitute a steady state of the discretionary equilibrium. Moreover, if the coefficient of 
‘relative risk aversion’ in consumption is less (greater) than one at this steady state, then, 
within a neighbourhood of it, a discretionary equilibrium which converges on it exists (does 
not exist). 
In the case σ < 1 we also find, more specifically, that ψ′ lies in (0,1) (ensuring that 
convergence is monotonic), and that θ′ and e′ are negative. Thus, as the Friedman Rule is 
approached, debt steadily falls (or equivalently - once debt becomes negative - government 
assets steadily rise) and consumption steadily rises. Inflation also steadily falls (becomes 
more negative). This is the outcome obtained by Obstfeld (1991, 1997). Such an outcome 
differs from what happens under commitment, where, if σ < 1, consumption also rises along 
an optimal time path, but only between periods 0 and l. Debt correspondingly falls between 
periods 0 and 1, but remains permanently above its Friedman Rule level. The clue as to why a 
government acting under discretion goes farther in reducing its debt over time than a 
government acting under commitment, lies in the negative e′, as Obstfeld pointed out. e′ < 0 
means that lower debt (lower kt+1) induces higher current consumption through affecting 
private agents’ expectations (recall (20)). From the government’s perspective, e′ < 0 thus 
increases the ‘return’ to a marginal reduction in the debt: not only does lower debt next 
period mean the future inflation-tax revenue needed is lower, but also, by lowering private 
expectations of future inflation
14, it raises current consumption. By contrast, under 
commitment, private agents do not use the level of government debt as the basis for their 
forecasts - instead, they trust the government to carry out today’s optimal plan. Hence a 
change in the debt level per se does not have this added ‘Obstfeld effect’.
15 
A numerical illustration of a set of discretionary equilibria (one for each initial value of 
kt) converging on the FRSS is given in Figure 3. This is calculated for the CRRA utility 
                                                 
14 To see this, note that since θ′ is negative, and recalling that θ′ =  ˆ θ′ , a reduction in kt+1 raises private agents’ 
forecasts of ct+1. ct+1 is negatively related to expected inflation pt+1/pt by (2)-(3). 
15 Although, under this outcome, utility is higher in the long run under discretion than under commitment, 
lifetime utility from the perspective of period 0 is lower, because consumption in the short run can be shown to 
be lower. This is as it should be, because inability to commit acts as a constraint on the optimal policy.   20
function with σ = 0.5, α = 5 and β = 0.95. (We have also set gt = 0 for all t.) A description of 
the algorithm used for the computations is provided in Appendix C. The Friedman-Rule 
consumption level in this example is c = 0.04, and the corresponding level of ‘commitments’ 
needed to sustain this is k = -0.04. Panel (a) shows the e(kt) function for this example. This 
confirms the negative effect of the stock of debt (to which ‘commitments’ are here 
equivalent), operating via private-sector expectations, on ct-1. Panel (b) shows the θ(kt) 
function (the line labelled ‘ct’), indicating the negative total effect of the stock of debt on the 
government’s optimal choice of ct. Note that the range of ct values considered extends from 
the maximum, Friedman-Rule, value down to approximately one quarter of that value, so that 
the picture is not just concerned with a small neighbourhood of the FRSS. The function is 
clearly quite close to being linear. Panel (c) plots the ψ(kt) function and also, for reference, 
the 45
o line. As Proposition 1 predicts, the slope is less than one - in fact, it is about 0.9 - 
which confirms that the economy does indeed converge monotonically on the FRSS for any 
initial level of debt above -0.04. For comparison, panel (b) also plots the two consumption 
levels which result from the problem under commitment. The line ‘c0’ gives consumption in 
the first period of an optimal plan as a function of the initial debt k0; while the line ‘c’ gives 
consumption in the second and all later periods, again as a function of k0. We thus see that for 
the same inherited level of debt, in this example consumption in the short run is chosen to be 
lower under discretion than under commitment and, correspondingly, inflation is chosen to be 
higher. 
When σ > 1, however, Proposition 1 indicates that it is not possible for the outcome 
obtained by Obstfeld to occur in our model. The force driving the economy away from the 
Friedman-Rule outcome in such a case is discussed below in the context of Proposition 2. 
This suggests that in this case the destination may instead be the time-consistent steady state, 
where the latter exists. 
We now turn to the local dynamics of the TCSS. At the TCSS itself, σ = 1 and e′ = 0, as 
shown previously. Hence θ′′ drops out of (31), and the simultaneous system of (29), (31) and 
(32) can be reduced to the system of just (31) and (32), in the unknowns θ′ and e′′. From this 
we may hope to solve for θ′ and e′′. Appendix B presents the relevant calculations. We show   21
that the system can be reduced to a quadratic equation in θ′ as the single unknown, analogous 
to, but different from, the quadratic applying at the FRSS. Once θ′ has been determined, ψ′ 
follows from (30). Since the quadratic implies two possible solutions for θ′, there are also 
two possible solutions for ψ′. The point of particular interest is whether either of the solutions 
for ψ′ have absolute value less than one. The key result demonstrated in Appendix D is that if 
σ′ > 0, there is exactly one solution for ψ′ with absolute value less than one; but if σ′ < 0 
there are no solutions with absolute value less than one. Combining this with our earlier 
findings, we thus conclude that: 
Proposition 2 If the critical consumption and debt levels as defined for the problem 
under commitment exist, then a steady state of the discretionary equilibrium also exists at 
these consumption and debt levels. Inflation could be positive or negative at this steady state. 
Moreover if, under commitment, initial debt above the critical level was associated with a 
temptation to create surprise inflation (deflation), and below, with a temptation to create 
surprise deflation (inflation), then, under discretion, within a neighbourhood of the steady 
state, an equilibrium which converges on it exists (does not exist). 
As Proposition 2 emphasises, in the neighbourhood of the critical consumption level 
there is a close relationship between the optimal policy under commitment and that under 
discretion. Moreover, in the case where under commitment a temptation to surprise inflation 
is associated with debt above the critical level and vice versa (i.e. in the case where σ′ > 0), 
we can show that 0 < ψ′ < 1, thus ensuring that convergence under discretion is monotonic; 
and we can also show that θ′ and e′′ are negative. If k0 > kc, consumption then steadily rises 
over time until it reaches the critical level. Along this path, inflation and debt are falling. If, 
on the other hand, k0 < kc, then consumption steadily falls over time, with accompanying rises 
in debt and inflation. By comparison, under commitment, paths with the same k0 would 
involve a rise or a fall in consumption (respectively) between periods 0 and 1, and a 
corresponding fall or rise in debt during period 0, but they would not continue all the way to 
(cc,kc). The reason why the evolution is carried further under discretion is that e′ < 0 at k0 > kc 
and e′ > 0 at k0 < kc, as follows from the fact that e′′ < 0 at the TCSS. e′ < 0 means that there   22
is an ‘Obstfeld effect’, as described above, so that the government perceives additional 
benefits of debt decumulation when unable to commit. e′ > 0, by contrast, implies that there is 
a ‘reverse Obstfeld effect’: now a marginal increase in end-of-period debt raises current 
consumption through the effect on agents’ expectations, giving the government an incentive 
to accumulate debt relative to the case in which it can commit. Intuitively, e′ > 0 here because 
this is the region of k0 in which, under commitment, the temptation is to create surprise 
deflation. In this region, for a government following the optimal committed policy, after one 
period the higher debt which it faces would create an incentive for it to choose consumption 
to be greater than in the plan: under discretion, this incentive is reflected in the way debt 
influences consumption through expectations.
16 
Figure 4 provides a numerical example of a set of discretionary equilibria (one for each 
initial value of kt) converging on a TCSS. This is calculated for the quadratic utility function 
with  ˆ c = 0.08, α = 0.03619 and β = 0.95. (Again, gt = 0 for all t.) The algorithm used is again 
that described in Appendix C. The implied ‘critical’ value cc, i.e. where σ(c) = 1, is 0.04, and 
correspondingly kc = 0.04. The e(kt) function for this example is depicted in panel (a). As 
predicted by the theory, it shows that the gradient is zero at kc and the shape is concave: i.e. 
small increases in debt here affect consumption via the public’s expectations in opposite 
ways, depending on whether debt is high or low. Panel (b) plots the total effect of debt on the 
government’s optimal choice of ct. The dynamics of debt are illustrated in panel (c). To make 
the picture clearer, we plot kt+1-kt on the vertical axis, since kt+1 as a function of kt turns out to 
be very close to the 45
o line. It can be seen that the TCSS at kc is indeed stable, even if 
convergence is very slow. Panel (c) also shows the FRSS (at k = -0.0438) and so reveals how 
it is unstable. For comparison, in panel (b) we also plot the two consumption levels which 
result from the problem under commitment (cf. Figure 3). We see that while, for debt above 
                                                 
16 Having established that e′ = 0, e′′ < 0 in the neighbourhood of the TCSS, it is straightforward to check and 
confirm that the second-order conditions for the government’s optimisation problem are satisfied when e(.) has 
these properties. In the neighbourhood of the FRSS we cannot determine e′′ analytically. However our 
numerical experiment confirms that a maximum exists for the chosen parameter values, and also suggests that 
under CRRA utility e′′ = 0 more generally may not be a bad approximation. It is again straightforward to check 
and confirm that the second-order conditions are satisfied when e(.) is linear.   23
kc, consumption in the short run is lower under discretion than commitment, for debt below kc 
the opposite is true. 
Our results demonstrate the main claim made in the Introduction, which is that it is not 
inevitable that under discretion the optimal policy will converge on the Friedman Rule. As 
we have just argued, the force which may prevent the attainment of the Friedman Rule, or 
even drive the economy away from it, is the fact that under commitment there can be an 
incentive to surprise deflation rather than surprise inflation. 
It may be remarked that, although the conditions for local convergence to the FRSS and 
TCSS are not the same, it turns out they appear similar when viewed in terms of the 
‘expansion path’ diagram. For local convergence to be possible, at either steady state the 
expansion path must cut, or meet, the 45
o line from above. This is because the stability 
conditions in Propositions 1 and 2 are the same as those governing the slopes of the 
expansion path at the relevant points, as is clear from the results in Section 3. Thus, if the 
expansion path has the shape illustrated in Figure 2, then, under discretionary policy, local 
convergence to the FRSS is not possible, but local convergence to the TCSS is. If instead the 
expansion path lies everywhere above the 45
o line - except at the Friedman Rule point where 
it must meet it - then the FRSS is the only steady state under discretion, and local 




Our main findings having been summarised in the Introduction, we here comment on 
their generality. First, it is not essential to the results that we have used a cash-in-advance 
framework. A common alternative is the money-in-the-utility function approach. If this is 
adopted, then, in order to capture a welfare cost of current inflation, an analogous modelling 
device to the use of ‘Svensson’s timing’ in cash-in-advance is to use beginning-of-period 
nominal balances deflated by the current price as the real balances variable in the utility 
function (as is done, in a different application, by Neiss (1999)). In early work we employed 
                                                 
17 These are the only two possible shapes for the expansion path under quadratic or CARA utility.   24
such an approach and obtained results which exactly parallel those presented here. In fact, it 
can be shown that the two approaches are mathematically equivalent. However the 
interpretation required of the functions is different: what matters in the money-in-the-utility 
function approach is the shape of the utility-of-real-balances function, rather than the shape of 
the utility-of-consumption function. 
Second, the precise conditions which we have obtained in this paper for a time-
consistent steady state of the discretionary equilibrium to exist, and for convergence to it to 
be possible, are ones which we would not expect to be robust to other ways of modelling the 
welfare cost of current inflation. The way the latter is represented here is simple and 
convenient but there are more sophisticated ways in which it could be captured, such as in the 
‘limited participation’ models referred to earlier. Nevertheless we would still expect that a 
‘time-consistent steady state’, as we have defined it, could occur in such models, albeit with 
modifications to the exact conditions for its existence. Hence we anticipate that our 
conclusion that optimal monetary policy under discretion does not necessarily converge on 
the Friedman Rule would still apply in more general models. 
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FIGURE 3 Discretionary equilibrium with CRRA utility 
σ = 0.5, α = 5, β = 0.95; FRSS value of kt = -0.04 
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FIGURE 4 Discretionary equilibrium with quadratic utility 
ˆ c=0.08, α = 0.03619, β = 0.95; TCSS value of kt = 0.04; FRSS value of kt = -0.0438 
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Appendices 
A. Dynamics in the neighbourhood of the Friedman-Rule steady state 
As noted in the main text, setting U′ = α causes e′′ to drop out of (32). The square root 
on the right-hand side of (32) can then be evaluated exactly, so that (32) reduces to: 
 
2 1
1( ) o r 1 e θβ
β
′′ += + . (A1) 
The solution 1+θ′ = 1 we discard, since it is inconsistent with local convergence. To see this, 
note that in combination with (29) it implies e′ = 0, and hence (30) implies ψ′ = 1/β, which 
has absolute value greater than one. We focus, then, on the other solution in (A1). 
Substituting out e′ using (29) and re-arranging, we arrive at the following quadratic equation 
in θ′ as the single unknown, as referred to in the main text: 
 
22 [1 ] ( ) [2(1 ) 1/ ] [1 1/ ] 0 σθ σ β θ β ′′ −+ − − + − = . (A2) 
Rather than study the implications of this for θ′, it is of greater interest to study its 
implications for ψ′. Using the solution from (A1) in (30), we have: 
 () / e ψ ββ ′ ′ = +  
 1( 1 ) σ θ′ = +− , (A3) 
where the second line again employs (29). We may now use (A3) to re-express (A2) as a 











Denoting this equation schematically as 
2 () 0 ab c ψψ ′′ + +=, we proceed to some 
standard tests to determine its implications for ψ′. First, the roots are real if b
2-4ac > 0, which 
we may easily verify always to be satisfied. Second, their sum is -b/a = 1/β(1-σ) and their 
product is c/a = σ/β(1-σ), whence σ < 1 implies two positive roots and σ > 1 implies one   2
positive and one negative. Third, consider the two test parameters (a+b+c)/(a-b+c)  and       
(c-a)/(a-b+c). If the first test parameter is negative, there is exactly one root with absolute 
value less than one; if it is positive, then there are either 0 or 2 roots with absolute value less 
than one as, respectively, the second test parameter is positive or negative. We have: 
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. 
If σ < 1, the first test parameter is negative, so there is exactly one root with absolute value 
less than one. (From the foregoing, we can moreover say that this root must be positive.) If σ 
> 1, the first test parameter is positive, and the second is also positive, so there are no roots 
with absolute value less than one. These are the results asserted in the main text. 
Having seen that when σ < 1 there exists a ψ′ ∈ (0,1), it follows from (A3) that the 
associated θ′ and e′ are negative, as also asserted in the main text. 
B. Dynamics in the neighbourhood of the time-consistent steady state 
As noted in the main text, setting σ = 1 and e′ = 0 causes θ′′ to drop out of (31), so that 
(31) and (32) then constitute a system of two equations in the two unknowns e′′ and θ′. Using 
(31) to substitute e′′ out of (32) and re-arranging, we obtain a cubic equation in θ′. However, 
θ′ = 0 turns out to be one root of this equation. We discard this root, since it is inconsistent 
with local convergence. (To see this, note that θ′ = 0 together with e′ = 0 imply, from (30), 
that ψ′ = 1/β, which has absolute value greater than one.) The remaining equation in θ′ is 
then the quadratic: 
 
2 [ / 1] (1 ) [( / 1) 1](1 ) 0 Uc Uc ασθ ασ θ β ′′ ′′′ ′ −+ − − + + + = , (B1) 
as referred to in the main text. 
Rather than study the implications of this for θ′, it is of greater interest to study its 
implications for ψ′. Using e′ = 0 in (30) we have ψ′ = (1+θ′)/β. This enables us to re-express 
(B1) as a quadratic equation in ψ′:   3
 
2 [/ 1 ] () [ (/ 1 ) 1 ] 1 0 Uc Uc ασ β ψ ασ ψ ′′ ′′′ ′ −− − + + = . (B2) 
Next, notice that the term (U′/α - 1)cσ′ + 1 in this equation is equal to the inverse slope of the 
expansion path at the critical consumption level cc, as can be seen from (14). Hence, denoting 







βψ ψ ′′ −+ =
−−
. (B3) 
Our concern is now with the implications of (B3) for ψ′, and especially with whether 
any of the roots of (B3) have absolute value less than one. At this point it may be observed 
that (B3) is identical in form to the equation (A4) analysed above, but with ‘s’ in (B3) 
replacing ‘σ’ in (A4). Therefore the conclusions reached above also apply here. That is, if s < 
1, there is exactly one root with absolute value less than one (and we can moreover say that 
this root must be positive). If s > 1, there are no roots with absolute value less than one. 
Given that s is < 1 or > 1 as σ′ > 0 or < 0, respectively, then, translated into statements about 
σ′, the conclusions are that if σ′ > 0, there is exactly one root with absolute value less than 
one; and if σ′ < 0, there are no roots with absolute value less than one. These are the results 
asserted in the main text. 
Having seen that when σ′ > 0 there exists a ψ′ ∈ (0,1), it follows from ψ′ = (1+θ′)/β 
that the associated θ′ is negative, and from (31) that e′′ is negative, as also asserted in the 
main text. 
C. The algorithm used for numerical computations 
The value function for the policy problem (24) - call it V(kt) - must satisfy the Bellman 
equation: 
  [ ] 11 1 () () ( ) s . t . ( ) max tt t t t t t t
t
Vk Uc c g Vk k ek k c
c
ααβ β ++ + =− − + = + − . 
θ(kt) - (27) in the main text - is the associated policy function. If e(kt+1) were a known, 
exogenous function we could compute V(kt) by the standard method of iterating on the value 
function. According to this method we begin by making a guess at the value function: V0(kt),   4
say. This function is approximated numerically on a grid, and the maximisation operation 
described on the RHS of the Bellman equation is carried out by a grid search routine. In this 
way a new value function, V1(kt), is generated. The process is then repeated N times until the 
function has converged, as judged by an appropriate criterion of convergence. 
In our case, however, e(kt+1) is an unknown, endogenous function. It must satisfy (20) in 
the main text. This, then, suggests a ‘double iteration’ procedure. We first make a guess at 
e(kt+1): call it e
0(kt+1). Using this in the policy problem (24), we then employ the above value 
function iteration method to compute the corresponding value function - V
0(kt), say. 
Associated with this is a policy function, which we may denote θ
0(kt). In the next stage, we 
generate a new version of e(kt+1) by using (20): 
 
10 0
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e
1(kt+1) is then used to generate a new version of the policy problem, and the process loops 
round again. This higher-level iteration continues until successive versions of the function 
e(.) are judged to have converged. Helpful guesses for the initial function e
0(kt+1) can be 
obtained from Propositions 1 and 2. In particular we can directly calculate a linear 
approximation to e(kt+1) which is satisfied at either the FRSS or the TCSS, and which has the 
correct slope. 
The above algorithm, implemented in Gauss, was used to generate the numbers 
underlying Figures 3 and 4. www.st-and.ac.uk/cdma 
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